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Abstract
Pauly (1990) argues that an explanation for the low long-term care (LTC) insurance demand
could be intra-family moral hazard: parents might refuse to buy insurance since it reduces children's
incentives to provide care. This paper raises and explores the idea that the extent of intra-family
moral hazard and the non-purchase of LTC insurance might diﬀer when insurance beneﬁts are ﬁxed
and when they are proportional to LTC expenditure. It shows that ﬁxed beneﬁts limit and might even
eliminate intra-family moral hazard, while the eﬀect of proportional beneﬁts is at best ambiguous.
Consequently, the non-purchase of insurance is less likely with ﬁxed beneﬁts.
JEL codes: D14, D64, G22, I11, J14.
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Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) has been increasingly becoming a hot topic over the last years, and its importance
is predicted to grow even more in the coming decades. LTC is the care for people who are dependent on
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the help of others in their basic daily activities (such as dressing, bathing, eating, etc.). It can be seen
as consisting of both health and social care which can be provided both formally (by paid professional
caregivers) and informally (by family members or friends), at home and in special institutions. Since the
need for this kind of care is highly related with age,1 more and more attention to LTC issues is required
due to the apparent population ageing in most developed countries. Indeed, the European Union has
estimated that from 2007 to 2060 the number of dependent old persons in the EU27 might increase by
90 or even by 115 percent, which means that the number of dependent elderly might possibly more than
double (European Commission, 2009).2 In the light of these trends, it is important to make sure that our
societies are ready to successfully face the challenge. For the moment, however, a number of unresolved
issues exist.
One of such issues is the so-called LTC insurance puzzle. This puzzle has been created by a surprisingly
low demand for private LTC insurance. In particular, even though the potential LTC costs are large3 and
the probability to become dependent is high,4 only a small fraction of individuals purchase private LTC
insurance. A number of diﬀerent factors potentially explaining this puzzle have been proposed in the
literature. Those possible explanations range from the ones that assume perfect rationality of individuals
(for instance, the high price of insurance or crowding out by the State) to the ones considering the non-
purchase of insurance as irrational (such as myopia or ignorance and denial of the issue of dependence).5
Even though it seems that none of the proposed reasons alone is able to entirely explain the puzzle, each
of them might be playing some role in the issue. Therefore, being able to solve or at least reduce (some
of) these potential problems might help to stimulate the market for private LTC insurance.
This paper deals with one of these potential problems. In particular, it is the problem of intra-family
moral hazard, which was proposed as a possible explanation for the LTC insurance puzzle by Pauly
(1990). The idea of intra-family moral hazard is that insurance owned by a parent reduces his/her
1For instance, around half of all LTC users in the OECD countries are over 80 years old (Colombo et al., 2011).
2A 90% increase is predicted assuming that age-speciﬁc disability rates will decline in the future, while a 115% increase
is expected if these rates remain constant (European Commission, 2009).
3For instance, a nursing home stay in the U.S. costs between $40 000 and $70 000 per year, while the average cost in
France is around ¿35 000 per year (Taleyson, 2003).
4According to Kemper and Murtaugh (1991), a 65-year-old person has a probability of 43% to enter a nursing home at
some time before his/her death. See also Norton (2000).
5For recent surveys of potential explanations for the puzzle, see Cremer et al. (2012), Pestieau and Ponthière (2011)
and Brown and Finkelstein (2011).
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children's incentives to provide informal care. Indeed, children might be induced to provide care to their
parents by the fact that their caregiving helps to decrease their parents' expenses on formal care and
thus protects the bequest that the parents will leave to them. However, if parents have LTC insurance,
the cost of formal care is (at least partly) covered by the insurer. Thus, LTC insurance also protects
their future bequest,6 which results in their children having less incentive to provide care. Pauly (1990)
then argues that, in the fear of intra-family moral hazard, parents who prefer being taken care of by their
children rather than by unknown formal caregivers might be discouraged from buying LTC insurance.
While Pauly's (1990) argument is developed with little formalization, Zweifel and Strüwe (1998) provide
a more rigorous model for this idea and show that it is indeed reasonable to believe that the intra-family
moral hazard eﬀect might be a cause of the non-purchase of LTC insurance.7
However, the analysis of Zweifel and Strüwe (1998) only focuses on one type of insurance beneﬁts,
namely, beneﬁts which are proportional to the amount of LTC expenditure.8 The present paper puts
forward the idea that the extent of the above described problem might be diﬀerent depending on the
form of insurance beneﬁts. The motivation for this idea is the following.
The proportional beneﬁts analyzed by Zweifel and Strüwe (1998) roughly capture the idea behind
LTC insurance beneﬁts prevalent in the U.S. where these beneﬁts take the form of a reimbursement
for the LTC expenditure the insured has, in the limit of a certain reimbursement ceiling (Duran and
Taleyson, 2003). However, this is not the only type of LTC insurance beneﬁts used in practice. For
instance, private insurers in France use a substantially diﬀerent beneﬁt scheme. Insurance payments in
France are of the form of a ﬁxed monthly cash beneﬁt which starts being paid if the insured is recognized
to be dependent. This beneﬁt does not depend on the amount of LTC expenditure and can be used
by the person in the way he/she decides.9 This clearly contrasts with the U.S. model where, in order
6Pauly (1990, 1996) names the protection of one's bequest as the main function of LTC insurance.
7Courbage and Zweifel (2011) suggest to look at intra-family moral hazard as at a two-sided phenomenon arguing that
apart from the eﬀect of insurance on incentives for children (one side of the phenomenon), the second side exists in that
parents may buy less insurance if they can rely on the caregiving eﬀort of their children. However, the caregiving eﬀort
in their paper is modeled as a preventive one that helps to keep the parent out of a nursing home (which can be seen as
preventing from a need for LTC). In this paper, I consider children's caregiving as the provision of care when their parents'
LTC need has already materialized and stick to deﬁning intra-family moral hazard as a one-sided phenomenon, namely, the
decrease in the children's caregiving incentives caused by the parents' insurance coverage, as suggested by Pauly (1990).
8Zweifel and Strüwe (1996) make a comparison between LTC insurance (with proportional beneﬁts) and trust saving
which is, however, a completely diﬀerent ﬁnancial instrument rather than another type of insurance beneﬁts.
9LTC insurance in the U.S. and France was originally developed on the basis of diﬀerent philosophies: the U.S. model
was inspired by health insurance products whereas the French one was derived from disability insurance (Kessler, 2008). It
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to be reimbursed, the LTC expenditure has to come from the use of services that are approved by the
insurer (Duran and Taleyson, 2003). Thus, in the American scheme the insured can only beneﬁt from
the insurance if he/she uses certain services of formal care. This is not the case with ﬁxed insurance
beneﬁts. Therefore, intuitively it seems that the use of formal care should be encouraged much less in
the case of ﬁxed beneﬁts, which should help to limit intra-family moral hazard. Some empirical studies
reviewed below seem to suggest this idea as well.
If the eﬀect of intra-family moral hazard is strong enough, it seems likely that the fear to distort
children's incentives might oﬀset altruistic considerations (such as intentions to ensure suﬃciently large
bequests to their children) that parents could have when making insurance purchase. Nevertheless,
interestingly enough, this does not seem to be the case in France. In particular, a study conducted by
Courbage and Roudaut (2008) ﬁnds empirical evidence that in France LTC insurance purchases are driven
by altruistic motives. First, they ﬁnd that the demand for LTC insurance rises with the probability of
leaving a bequest, which conﬁrms Pauly's (1990, 1996) argument that LTC insurance is purchased to
protect one's bequest. Further, they show that LTC insurance is positively associated with the number
of children and the fact of living with a partner. Finally, it is found that LTC insurance is positively
associated with the probability of receiving informal care in the case of such a need in the future. These
ﬁndings suggest that people are not afraid that insurance coverage will distort the caregiving incentives
of their relatives. In other words, the ﬁndings seem to suggest that in France the degree of intra-family
moral hazard is likely to be rather low.
For comparison, one could consider the study made by Sloan and Norton (1997) who do not ﬁnd
evidence for altruistic bequest motive in LTC insurance decisions in the U.S. They do not detect any
relationship between stated altruism (i.e. the person's wish to leave a bequest) and demand for LTC
insurance. This suggests that a parent might well be willing to leave a bequest, but still decide not to
purchase LTC insurance. While it is possible that some other reasons exist, one explanation for this could
be the attempt to avoid intra-family moral hazard. Therefore, one could suspect that intra-family moral
hazard is a more serious problem in the U.S. than in France. While it is again possible that some other
factors come into play as well, a potential explanation for this diﬀerence could be the diﬀerent nature of
should be noted that recently American insurance companies have started making ﬁxed beneﬁt contracts available as well.
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insurance beneﬁts.
The aim of this paper is to explore more formally the roles of ﬁxed and proportional insurance beneﬁts
in the issue of intra-family moral hazard. In particular, in the context of intra-family moral hazard, the
paper compares the impact of the two beneﬁt types on the LTC related behavior of children and eventually
on the insurance purchase decisions of parents.
The model considers an elderly parent and his adult child. The parent might become dependent, in
which case he places a special value on the LTC received from his child. The parent also cares about the
bequest that will be left to the child; thus, he might want to purchase insurance in order to protect his
bequest from LTC expenses. If the parent becomes dependent, the child chooses the amount of care she
wants to provide. I consider separately the cases when the child likes and dislikes providing care to the
parent. In addition to the amount of caregiving, the child's utility depends on her wealth which consists
of her labour market earnings and the parent's bequest. The bequest is the channel through which the
child's care provision is aﬀected by the insurance coverage the parent has. Reasoning backwards, the ﬁrst
part of the analysis studies the problem of the child and compares the eﬀects that insurance with ﬁxed
and proportional beneﬁts has on the child's choice of caregiving. The second part explores how these
diﬀerent eﬀects (anticipated by the parent) inﬂuence the parent's insurance purchase decisions.
The model is generally based on Zweifel and Strüwe (1998). However, as mentioned above, Zweifel
and Strüwe (1998) analyze only proportional insurance beneﬁts. Therefore, the case of ﬁxed beneﬁts
is introduced in this paper and comparisons between the two types of beneﬁts are made. In addition,
Zweifel and Strüwe (1998) model the parent and the child as the principal and the agent. I do not adopt
this approach here but rather follow the idea of equal treatment of both parties suggested by Courbage
and Zweifel (2011).10 It should be also mentioned that, diﬀerently from Zweifel and Strüwe (1998), the
present paper looks at the problem of the child from the perspective of the standard consumer's theory,
which allows to identify and understand the substitution and income eﬀects that inﬂuence the child's
choice.
The paper ﬁnds that the amount of caregiving of a child who dislikes providing care is decreasing in
10However, in Courbage and Zweifel (2011) the parent's choice of insurance and the child's choice of care provision are
modeled as simultaneous decisions. Here the choices are sequential since the parent has to make the insurance decision ﬁrst
(before one of the two possible states of nature materializes), and the child chooses the amount of care only when (and if)
the state of nature with the need for LTC materializes.
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the parent's insurance coverage with both proportional and ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts. Thus, intra-family
moral hazard exists with both types of beneﬁts. However, it is also shown that the same amount of LTC
insurance purchased by the parent results in more care given by the child when insurance beneﬁts are
ﬁxed than when they are proportional. This conﬁrms that ﬁxed beneﬁts indeed mitigate the phenomenon
of intra-family moral hazard. On the other hand, intra-family moral hazard is never a problem with ﬁxed
insurance beneﬁts when the child likes providing care. In that case, ﬁxed beneﬁts not only eliminate
intra-family moral hazard but also trigger an opposite eﬀect, namely, an increase in the child's caregiving.
With proportional beneﬁts, both an increase and a decrease in the child's care provision is possible, which
means that intra-family moral hazard cannot be completely ruled out. In addition, even in the case when
intra-family moral hazard is not a problem with either type of beneﬁts, it is shown that the child's
chosen amount of caregiving is greater with ﬁxed than with proportional insurance beneﬁts. Turning to
the parent, it is shown that, in the context of intra-family moral hazard, ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts make
insurance more desirable to him. Even though ﬁxed beneﬁts do not always guarantee that the parent will
ﬁnd insurance beneﬁcial, purchasing a positive amount of insurance is more likely to be in the parent's
interest when beneﬁts are ﬁxed rather than proportional.
The results of the paper conﬁrm that a low degree of intra-family moral hazard in France could (at
least partly) be attributed to the use of ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts. Moreover, the results could also to some
extent explain the relative success of the French private LTC insurance market. While the French and the
American markets are the world's two most developed markets for private LTC insurance, in 2010, about
15% of the population aged 40 and over had private LTC insurance in France, compared to only 5% in
the U.S. (Colombo et al., 2011). Given the ﬁndings of the paper, it seems reasonable to believe that the
use of ﬁxed beneﬁts takes part in the success of France. Indeed, if ﬁxed beneﬁts (through the softening
of intra-family moral hazard) can make it more likely that a parent will decide to purchase insurance,
the use of this insurance scheme could be seen as a reason for the success of attracting customers in the
French LTC insurance market.11
While the results in this paper support the idea that ﬁxed beneﬁts help to encourage the demand
11Fixed beneﬁts have been recognized as contributing to the success of the French market by several authors (Duran
and Taleyson (2003), Kessler (2008), Taleyson (2003)). However, these papers do not develop any formal modeling and
emphasize somewhat diﬀerent features of ﬁxed beneﬁt contracts (such as simplicity and ﬂexibility) as the ones that encourage
the demand for insurance.
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for insurance, it also has to be mentioned that, on the other hand, the use of ﬁxed beneﬁt schemes
can be seen as one of the reasons for the non-purchase of LTC insurance. This idea is based on the
argument that ﬁxed beneﬁt insurance contracts are incomplete, which might discourage rational agents
from purchasing insurance (see Cutler (1993) as well as Cremer et al. (2012) and Pestieau and Ponthière
(2011)). However, it should be emphasized that the present paper analyzes the features of insurance
beneﬁts focusing exclusively on the context of intra-family moral hazard. Therefore, the paper does not
intend to draw general conclusions about the role of the two analyzed types of beneﬁts in LTC insurance
but rather aims at exploring them by isolating their eﬀects in one particular context.
The paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section introduces and describes the model. The second
section looks at the problem of the child and studies the impact that insurance with ﬁxed and proportional
beneﬁts has on her choice of care provision. The third section turns to the parent and analyzes his
insurance purchase decisions. Finally, the last section concludes.
1 The model
Let us consider an elderly parent p and his adult child c. The parent might become dependent (i.e. need
LTC) with probability pi and might remain independent with probability 1−pi. Let us discuss the parent
and the child in turn.
The expected utility function of the parent can be written as
EUp = piUpD + (1− pi)UpI (1)
where UpD = u
p(Q, WDp ) is the parent's utility when he is dependent and U
p
I = v
p(X, W Ip ) is his utility
when he is independent.
When the parent is not dependent, his utility depends on his consumption level X (with ∂v
p
∂X > 0 and
∂2vp





> 0 and ∂
2vp
(∂W Ip )
2 < 0) which will be left at the end of his
life as a bequest to the child.12 In other words, the parent experiences a joy-of-giving from being able to
12I assume that the parent does not have any other beneﬁciaries and thus he will leave all his wealth to the child.
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leave a bequest to the child.13
When the parent is dependent, similarly to Zweifel and Strüwe (1998), it is assumed for simplicity
that he needs a certain exogenously determined total amount of care (time) L¯. This amount is ﬁxed
and does not enter explicitly his utility function. It can be assumed that if the total amount of care
is lower than L¯, the parent's utility equals −∞, and if the total amount of care exceeds L¯, the utility
remains constant. To simplify even more, we can assume that the parent needs care all the time and so
L¯ measures the total number of hours in the period analyzed. Moreover, it is assumed that a dependent
parent's consumption is entirely determined by his disability and neither gives him a particular pleasure
nor can be chosen by him. Therefore, a dependent parent's consumption is not included in his utility
function and its cost is assumed to be encompassed in the cost of care. However, the parent places a
special value on the amount of LTC provided to him by his child (Q). Thus, Q explicitly enters the utility
function and it is assumed that ∂u
p
∂Q > 0 (with
∂2up
(∂Q)2 < 0). If the child does not provide enough care to
reach L¯, the parent needs to buy formal care services of the amount L¯ − Q. Formal care does not give
any particular utility to the parent. Its only function is to ensure that L¯ is achieved and its amount is
thus only reﬂected in the budget constraint presented below. As in the case of independence, the parent
also cares about his ﬁnal wealth (bequest) WDp (with
∂up
∂WDp





The parent can purchase LTC insurance. I consider two diﬀerent cases in terms of the type of insurance
beneﬁts paid. In the ﬁrst case, the insurance beneﬁt is proportional to the amount of LTC expenditure
(that is, the amount of purchased formal care). In other words, in this case insurance directly lowers the
price of formal care. This is the type of beneﬁts considered by Zweifel and Strüwe (1998). In the second
case, the insurance beneﬁt is ﬁxed and is paid independently of the amount of formal care purchased.
Let us ﬁrst look at the case of proportional insurance beneﬁts. Denote by δ the price of one hour of
formal provision of LTC and by γ ∈ [0, 1] the share of the price that is paid by the insurance company.
The amount of formal care that the parent will have to purchase if he becomes dependent will be equal

















for all (X, W Ip ) so that v
p(X, W Ip ) is strictly concave.






, but it seems likely to be positive since the parent is
likely to enjoy leaving a bequest more when the child provides more care to him (even though it could be that the marginal
utility of bequest is independent of Q and thus the cross-derivative equal to zero).
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to L¯ − Q. Thus, the (actuarially fair) insurance premium is equal to piγδ(L¯ − Q) (the expected beneﬁt
from the insurance).15 Denoting by W¯p the parent's initial wealth, we can write the parent's ﬁnal wealth
if he is dependent:
WDp = W¯p − piγδ(L¯−Q)− (1− γ)δ(L¯−Q) (2)
and if he is independent:
W Ip = W¯p − piγδ(L¯−Q)−X (3)
The parent's choice of insurance is modeled as his choice of γ.
Now let us turn to the case of ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts. Denoting by B the ﬁxed insurance beneﬁt
received in case of dependence, the (actuarially fair) insurance premium is equal to piB. If the parent is
dependent, his ﬁnal wealth can be written as
WDp = W¯p − piB − δ(L¯−Q) +B (4)
and if he is independent, his ﬁnal wealth writes as
W Ip = W¯p − piB −X (5)
Here, the parent's choice of insurance is modeled as his choice of B.
Let us now turn to the child. Since we are interested in the child only in the state of nature where the
parent becomes dependent, the child's utility is considered only in that case. This utility can be written
as
U cD = u
c(Q, WDc ) (6)
The child's utility depends on the amount of LTC that she provides to her parent (Q) and on her wealth




16 As usual, ∂u
c
∂WDc
> 0 and ∂
2uc
(∂WDc )
2 < 0 are assumed. As far as Q is concerned, I will look separately
at the case where the child dislikes providing care to the parent (∂u
c
∂Q < 0) and at the case where she
likes providing care (∂u
c
∂Q > 0).
17 In both cases it is assumed that ∂
2uc
(∂Q)2 < 0, that is, when the child
dislikes providing care, her utility (holding WDc constant) is decreasing in Q at an increasing rate, and
when the child likes providing care, her utility (holding WDc constant) is increasing in Q at a decreasing
rate.18
As mentioned above, the parent's ﬁnal wealth is left to the child as a bequest. Thus, the child's wealth
can be written as
WDc = w(L¯−Q) +WDp (7)
where w is the child's hourly wage and (L¯−Q) is the amount of time the child works.19n
The timing of the model is the following. First, the parent makes the insurance purchase decision.
Then, the risk of dependence materializes or not. If the parent remains independent, he chooses his
consumption level X. If the parent becomes dependent, the child (knowing the insurance decision made
by the parent) decides how much LTC she will provide; the rest is purchased by the parent in the form
of formal care.
An additional remark could also be made at this point. This concerns the case of proportional
insurance beneﬁts. In that case, the insurance premium piγδ(L¯ −Q) depends on Q. However, when the
child makes her choice of Q, she considers the premium as ﬁxed because at that point the premium is
already paid and cannot be changed. The child chooses Q which depends on the insurance coverage
reﬂected by γ. By backward induction, the insurance company (correctly) anticipates Q(γ) and bases
the premium on it: piγδ(L¯ − Q(γ)). In the same way, the parent also (correctly) anticipates Q(γ) and
16Since we are interested in the child's choice of care for the parent and not in her consumption decisions, to simplify the
presentation I assume that the child's utility depends only on her wealth and not on her wealth and consumption.
17In general, caregiving might at the same time be associated both with a certain degree of disutility and with a certain
degree of utility coming, for instance, from altruistic feelings or the appreciation of the time spent with the parent. Thus,
the cases the child dislikes providing care and the child likes providing care can be seen as shortcuts to reﬂect respectively
the situation when the disutility of caregiving oﬀsets the utility and the situation when the utility of caregiving oﬀsets the
disutility.

















for all (Q, WDc ) so that u
c(Q, WDc ) is strictly concave.
19As noted above, I assume that L¯ measures the total number of hours in the period analyzed.
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takes it into account in his expected utility maximization.
We proceed by reasoning backwards and start by looking at the caregiving choice of the child.
2 Fixed vs Proportional: The impact on the child's choice
This section looks at the child's choice of LTC provision in the state of nature when the parent becomes
dependent. In particular, the aim of the analysis is to compare the impact that insurance coverage has
on the child's caregiving choice with proportional and with ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts. As mentioned above,
I will consider separately the case where the child dislikes providing care to the parent (∂u
c
∂Q < 0) and the
case where she likes providing care (∂u
c
∂Q > 0).




First, it should be noted that at this stage of the analysis the parent's choice of insurance is already made;
thus, the value of γ or B is considered by the child as given. Having this in mind, we can characterize
three possible ranges for the values of the child's wage w:
 w ≥ δ, that is, the child's wage is higher than the (full) price of formal care. In this case, the child
will never decide to provide care to the parent, even if the parent has no insurance coverage. This
is because care provision gives no beneﬁt to the child: on the one hand, she dislikes providing care;
on the other hand, by providing care she gains less in terms of the parent's bequest than loses by
not participating in the labour market. This case is not interesting for comparing the impact of
diﬀerent insurance beneﬁts and thus will not be considered in what follows.
 (1 − γ)δ ≤ w < δ, that is, the child's wage is lower than the full price of formal care but higher
than the price of formal care when insurance with proportional beneﬁts has been purchased. Here,
we will again have a corner solution Q = 0 in the case of insurance with proportional beneﬁts.
However, in the case of ﬁxed beneﬁts, the full price of formal care has to be considered, and thus,
in that case, there will be an interior solution for Q. In what follows, I will focus only on interior
solutions; therefore, due to the corner solution with proportional beneﬁts, this range for w will not
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be considered. On the other hand, here it is quite clear that the child will provide more care in the
case of ﬁxed beneﬁts than in the case of proportional ones.
 w < (1 − γ)δ, that is, the child's wage is lower even than the price of formal care when insurance
with proportional beneﬁts has been purchased. In this case, we have interior solutions with both
types of insurance beneﬁts. I will thus further focus on this range for w.
The child's problem in the case of proportional insurance beneﬁts can be written as follows:
max
Q,WDc
U cD = u
c(Q, WDc ) (8)
s.t. WDc = w(L¯−Q) + W¯p − piγδ(L¯−Q)− (1− γ)δ(L¯−Q) (9)
⇐⇒
WDc − [(1− γ)δ − w]Q = W¯p − piγδ(L¯−Q)− [(1− γ)δ − w]L¯ (10)
Written in this way - in particular, with the budget constraint rearranged in the form of equation
(10) - the child's problem reminds a standard consumer's problem with commodities Q and WDc , where
commodity Q is a bad. Since (1 − γ)δ > w, the term [(1 − γ)δ − w] is positive and measures how
much money the child saves by providing one additional hour of care (i.e. it is the diﬀerence between the
price of formal care that is not paid (and thus does not decrease the parent's bequest) and the child's
wage which could have been earned instead of providing care). Denoting this term by ppr, we have the
following budget constraint:
WDc − pprQ = W¯p − piγδ(L¯−Q)− pprL¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ipr
(11)
At the point when the child makes the decision, the insurance premium piγδ(L¯ − Q) is already paid
by the parent and is thus considered as ﬁxed by the child. Therefore, the right-hand side of (11) can be
seen as the exogenous income of the child (denoted by Ipr), whereas the left-hand side can be seen as the
child's expenditure. Commodity Q has a negative price −ppr, while the price of WDc is 1. Q is thus a
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bad in terms of utility, but it gives a ﬁnancial gain to the child.
In a similar way, the child's budget constraint in the case of ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts can be written
as
WDc − pfQ = W¯p − piB +B − pf L¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
If
(12)
where pf = δ − w > ppr. Thus, with ﬁxed beneﬁts the child's hourly gain from providing care is higher.
Solving the above deﬁned child's problem would give the child's chosen amounts of WDc and Q, which
would be functions of ppr and Ipr or pf and If . Following the standard consumer's theory, we can derive









i = pr, f (13)
where Q˜ is the compensated supply of care. For further use, let us discuss the signs of the two terms.
The compensated term ∂Q˜∂pi is positive because pi measures the child's gain from providing one additional
hour of care. Since care provision is a bad for the child (∂u
c
∂Q < 0), the time left after providing care
(L¯ − Q) increases her utility. If we assume that this time of leisure from providing care is a normal
good for the child, then we have ∂Q∂Ii < 0.
We can now turn to our question of interest, that is, the eﬀect of insurance on Q. In the case of





















































We should ﬁrst determine the sign of ∂Q∂γ . Since the denominator of equation (15) is positive, the
sign of ∂Q∂γ depends on the numerator. Let us thus discuss the terms in the numerator. The ﬁrst term
in the numerator is negative: since insurance reduces the price of formal care, the child saves less by
providing one additional hour of informal caregiving and this decrease in her hourly gain pushes her to
provide less care. This is the substitution eﬀect. The second term is the income eﬀect coming
from the change in the hourly gain. It is positive: the decrease in the hourly gain means that the
child is now saving less money in total (she is poorer), so she wants to provide more care to increase her
total savings. However, there is also an additional income eﬀect which is reﬂected by the third term.
It comes from the fact that the child's exogenous income (Ipr) depends on the amount of insurance as
well. The third term in the numerator is negative: insurance increases the exogenous income of the child
and thus the child can aﬀord reducing care provision which is a bad for her (equivalently, she can aﬀord

















Thus, due to the additional income eﬀect, the total income eﬀect is negative. Together with the
negative substitution eﬀect, this implies that the child's caregiving is decreasing in the insurance coverage
that the parent has.
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Now let us look at the case of ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts:

















(1− pi) < 0 (17)
In this case, insurance coverage does not aﬀect the hourly gain from care provision but only has an
impact on the child's exogenous income. As in the case of proportional beneﬁts, the child's exogenous
income is increased, which implies that she can aﬀord reducing her caregiving.
The above results can be summarized as the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Consider a child who dislikes providing LTC to her parent and assume that w <
(1−γ)δ holds after the parent's purchase of insurance. The amount of the child's caregiving is decreasing
in the parent's insurance coverage both in the case of proportional and in the case of ﬁxed insurance
beneﬁts.
Thus, insurance induces the child to reduce her care provision in both cases of insurance beneﬁts.
However, it is important to compare the magnitudes of the reduction. To do this, we ﬁrst have to make
things comparable. In particular, if in the ﬁxed beneﬁts case the insurance beneﬁt B is increased by 1
euro, in the proportional beneﬁts case we should also look at the situation where the insurance beneﬁt is












To compare these two expressions, we need to take a common starting point. A natural starting point
seems to be the situation when there is no insurance coverage. Evaluating ∂Q∂γ · dγ|d[γδ(L¯−Q)]=1 and ∂Q∂B




















The two expressions are negative, but, since ∂Q∂Ipr |γ=0 =
∂Q
∂If
|B=0 (and < 0), it can be easily seen that
the expression in (19) is larger in absolute value than the one in (20) because it has an additional term
− 1
(L¯−Q) · ∂Q˜∂ppr |γ=0 < 0. Thus, the purchase of 1 euro of insurance coverage induces the child to reduce
the provision of care more when insurance beneﬁts are proportional than when they are ﬁxed. We can
therefore formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Consider a child who dislikes providing LTC to her parent and assume that w <
(1−γ)δ holds after the parent's purchase of insurance. The parent's purchase of the ﬁrst euro of insurance
coverage induces the child to decrease the amount of her caregiving (with respect to the amount that she
would provide if the parent had no insurance) more when insurance beneﬁts are proportional than when
they are ﬁxed.
This proposition provides preliminary support for the idea that ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts help to miti-
gate intra-family moral hazard. On the other hand, it only concerns the marginal eﬀect of insurance with
respect to the situation of zero insurance coverage. A more general result can nevertheless be derived as
well. It is stated in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3. Consider a child who dislikes providing LTC to her parent and assume that w <
(1 − γ)δ holds after the parent's purchase of insurance. When the amount of beneﬁts obtained by the
parent from both types of insurance is the same, the child chooses to provide more care in the case of ﬁxed
beneﬁts than in the case of proportional beneﬁts. In addition, the child is better-oﬀ in the case of ﬁxed
beneﬁts.
Proposition 3 is proved graphically in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 depicts the child's preferences in terms
of her wealth and the time left after providing care to the parent (L¯−Q). Since care provision is a bad
for the child (∂u
c
∂Q < 0), this free time increases her utility. Therefore, the child's preferences can be
depicted using standard indiﬀerence curves.20
Line NT depicts the child's budget constraint in the case where the parent has purchased insurance




























implies that µc(L¯ − Q, WDc ) is also strictly concave (see footnote 18) and thus the indiﬀerence curves are strictly convex
as depicted in Figure 1.
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with proportional beneﬁts (rearranging equation (9) it can be seen that it has a slope of −[(1−γ)δ−w]).
Given this budget constraint, the child's optimal amount of free time is (L¯−Q)pr (since the insurance
company anticipates the child's choice, the insurance premium that was paid by the parent was based on
this amount: piγδ(L¯−Q)pr).
To see graphically the amount of insurance beneﬁts obtained in the proportional case, we can make
use of line NM. Line NM depicts a hypothetical budget constraint that the child would have if the parent
had paid the insurance premium piγδ(L¯ − Q)pr but had not received any insurance beneﬁts (thus, the
slope of NM is −[δ−w]). Therefore, the diﬀerence E'F shows the amount of insurance beneﬁts obtained
(this amount is equal to γδ(L¯−Q)pr).
Figure 1. Choices of a child who dislikes providing care
Now let us consider insurance with ﬁxed beneﬁts where the amount of beneﬁts B is equal to the
amount obtained in the proportional case, i.e. B = γδ(L¯ − Q)pr. In the case where the parent has
purchased such insurance, the child's budget constraint can be represented by line JK (which is parallel
to NM and thus has a slope of −[δ − w]). In this case the equilibrium is at E, and the amount of free
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time chosen by the child is (L¯−Q)f < (L¯−Q)pr. Thus, the child chooses less free time, which means
that she provides more care to the parent. Also, it should be noted that at E the child reaches a higher
indiﬀerence curve and thus has a higher level of utility. This proves Proposition 3.
To sum up, we have just seen, in the case of a child who dislikes providing care, that even though
the child's caregiving is decreasing in insurance coverage with both types of beneﬁts, the same amount of
LTC insurance purchased by the parent results in more care given by the child when insurance beneﬁts
are ﬁxed than when they are proportional. This indeed conﬁrms that the phenomenon of intra-family
moral hazard, although still existent, is less severe with ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts.




As in Case 1, let us start by deﬁning the interval for the child's wage w that we will focus on. There are
again three possibilities:
 w ≤ (1 − γ)δ. In this case, the child will provide care all the time (Q = L¯) irrespective of the
parent's insurance coverage. Thus, this case is not interesting for our analysis and will not be
considered further.
 (1− γ)δ < w ≤ δ. Here, we will again have the corner solution Q = L¯ in the case of ﬁxed insurance
beneﬁts, whereas with proportional insurance beneﬁts there will be an interior solution. As before,
this intermediate case will not be considered since it involves a corner solution; however, it again
seems clear that with proportional beneﬁts the child will provide less care than with ﬁxed ones.
 w > δ. In this case, we have interior solutions with both types of insurance beneﬁts. Thus, the
further analysis will be focused on this range for w.
The problem of the child writes in the same way as in Case 1, but the important diﬀerence is that
commodity Q is no longer a bad for the child (the child now enjoys providing care). Moreover, it is
now more convenient to slightly rearrange the child's budget constraint. In particular, in the case of
proportional insurance beneﬁts the budget constraint can be written as
WDc + [w − (1− γ)δ]Q = W¯p − piγδ(L¯−Q) + [w − (1− γ)δ]L¯ (21)
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Since w > (1−γ)δ, the term [w− (1−γ)δ] is positive and measures the opportunity cost of providing
one additional hour of care. Denoting this term by ρpr, we have
WDc + ρprQ = W¯p − piγδ(L¯−Q) + ρprL¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mpr
(22)
As in Case 1, the right-hand side of (22) can be seen as the exogenous income of the child (here
denoted by Mpr), whereas the left-hand side can be seen as the child's expenditure. Commodity Q now
has a positive price ρpr. In other words, the child enjoys helping the parent, but this has a cost because
by not working on the labour market she forgoes more than is saved by reducing formal care.
In a similar way, the child's budget constraint in the case of ﬁxed beneﬁts can be written as
WDc + ρfQ = W¯p − piB +B + ρf L¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mf
(23)
where ρf = w − δ < ρpr. Thus, the opportunity cost of providing one additional hour of care is lower
with ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts.
Similarly to Case 1, solving the above deﬁned child's problem would give the child's chosen amounts
of WDc and Q, which would be functions of ρpr and Mpr or ρf and Mf . We can again derive the Slutsky








i = pr, f (24)
The compensated term ∂Q˜∂ρi is negative since ρi measures the child's opportunity cost. If care provision
is a normal good for the child, then we have ∂Q∂Mi > 0.
We can now examine the eﬀect of insurance on Q. Proceeding as in Case 1, with proportional






















To determine the sign of ∂Q∂γ , let us start with the numerator of (25). The ﬁrst term in the numerator
is negative: since insurance decreases the price of formal care, the child's opportunity cost is increased
and this pushes her to provide less care. This is the substitution eﬀect. The second term is the income
eﬀect coming from the change in the opportunity cost. It is also negative: the increase in the
opportunity cost means that the child is now losing more money in total by providing care to the parent,
so she wants to provide less care since she is now poorer and care provision is a normal good. However,
there is again an additional income eﬀect (the third term in the numerator). It again comes from the
fact that the child's exogenous income (Mpr) depends on the amount of insurance as well. As in Case
1, insurance increases the exogenous income of the child, but now the eﬀect on caregiving is diﬀerent
since Q is no longer a bad. Since caregiving is enjoyable but costly, the increase in the exogenous income
induces the child to provide more care as she is now wealthier and can aﬀord spending more time on the
activity that she enjoys. The third term in the numerator is thus positive. If we combine the two income


















Due to the additional income eﬀect, the total income eﬀect is positive. However, the substitution
eﬀect is negative and so the sign of the total eﬀect in the numerator is not clear. In addition, the sign
of the denominator is ambiguous as well. Therefore, the eﬀect of insurance with proportional beneﬁts on
the child's caregiving is not clear in this case. It might be that insurance will decrease the child's care
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provision, but it might also happen that, on the contrary, the child will be induced to provide more care.







(1− pi) > 0 (27)
As in Case 1, with ﬁxed beneﬁts, insurance only has an impact on the child's exogenous income, which
is increased. However, since caregiving is now enjoyable to the child, the increase in the exogenous income
fosters care provision, just as explained in the discussion of proportional beneﬁts. As the exogenous income
eﬀect is the only eﬀect present when beneﬁts are ﬁxed, insurance coverage unambiguously increases the
child's caregiving. In other words, when the child likes providing care, insurance with ﬁxed beneﬁts
clearly does not cause intra-family moral hazard and even triggers an opposite eﬀect, namely, a rise in
care provision.21
We can summarize the above results as follows:
Proposition 4. Consider a child who likes providing LTC to her parent and has a wage w > δ.
The amount of the child's caregiving is increasing in the parent's insurance coverage in the case of ﬁxed
insurance beneﬁts. In the case of proportional beneﬁts, the eﬀect of insurance on the child's caregiving is
ambiguous.
The fact that intra-family moral hazard disappears with ﬁxed beneﬁt insurance but might still be
present with proportional beneﬁts (since a reduction in the child's caregiving cannot be ruled out in that
case) can be seen as an advantage of ﬁxed beneﬁt contracts. However, since the case when the child's
caregiving is increased with both types of beneﬁts is also possible, a deeper analysis should be made.
First, as in Case 1, we can compare the child's caregiving responses to the purchase of 1 euro of
insurance evaluated at the point of zero coverage. In particular, we can look at
21In general, an increase in the child's caregiving could be seen as a form of moral hazard as well since it is also a
modiﬁcation of the child's behavior caused by the presence of insurance. However, following the original argument of Pauly
(1990), I deﬁne intra-family moral hazard as a reduction in the child's care provision due to insurance coverage and thus



























It is already clear from Proposition 4 and also from equation (29) that with ﬁxed beneﬁts the child's





|γ=0 > (resp. =) ∂Q
∂Mpr
|γ=0(1− pi),
then the child reduces (resp. does not change) her caregiving. The child's caregiving is increased only if
− 1
(L¯−Q) · ∂Q˜∂ρpr |γ=0 <
∂Q
∂Mpr
|γ=0(1 − pi). However, we can see that the increase is smaller than with ﬁxed
beneﬁts since ∂Q∂Mpr |γ=0 =
∂Q
∂Mf
|B=0 and the ﬁrst term in (28) is negative. This can be summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 5. Consider a child who likes providing LTC to her parent and has a wage w > δ. If
with proportional beneﬁts the parent's purchase of the ﬁrst euro of insurance coverage induces the child
to increase the amount of her caregiving (with respect to the amount that she would provide if the parent
had no insurance), this increase is smaller than the increase in the case of ﬁxed beneﬁts.
Proposition 5 provides some preliminary evidence that, similarly to Case 1, insurance with ﬁxed
beneﬁts is associated with a higher amount of the child's care provision in this case as well. The analysis
below will conﬁrm that this is indeed true. In particular, the analysis below will prove the following
proposition (which is a counterpart here of Proposition 3 in Case 1):
Proposition 6. Consider a child who likes providing LTC to her parent and has a wage w > δ. When
the amount of beneﬁts obtained by the parent from both types of insurance is the same, the child chooses
to provide more care in the case of ﬁxed beneﬁts than in the case of proportional beneﬁts. In addition,
the child is better-oﬀ in the case of ﬁxed beneﬁts.
Similarly to Proposition 3, Proposition 6 is proved graphically. The analysis is based on Figure 2
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which depicts the child's preferences in terms of her wealth and care provision to the parent.
Line JT depicts the child's budget constraint in the case where the parent has purchased insurance
with proportional beneﬁts (it can be represented by equation (21) above and has a slope of −[w−(1−γ)δ]).
Given this budget constraint, the child's optimal amount of care provision is Qpr.
Line NT depicts a hypothetical budget constraint that the child would have if the parent had paid
the insurance premium piγδ(L¯ − Qpr) but had not received any insurance beneﬁts (the slope of NT is
−[w − δ]). The diﬀerence E'F shows the amount of insurance beneﬁts obtained in the proportional case
(this amount is equal to γδ(L¯−Qpr)).
Figure 2. Choices of a child who likes providing care
Now let us consider insurance with ﬁxed beneﬁts where the amount of beneﬁts is B = γδ(L¯−Qpr). In
the case where the parent has purchased such insurance, the child's budget constraint can be represented
by line MK (parallel to NT). In this case the equilibrium is at E, and the amount of care provision
chosen by the child is Qf > Qpr. Thus, the child chooses to provide more care to the parent. Also, at
E the child reaches a higher indiﬀerence curve. This proves Proposition 6.
To summarize, we have seen that when the child likes providing care, it is possible not to have intra-
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family moral hazard at all. This phenomenon will never be present in the case of ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts,
whereas it might still arise with proportional ones. Thus, while in Case 1 ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts play
the role of mitigating intra-family moral hazard, here they not only eliminate this phenomenon but also
trigger an opposite eﬀect, namely, an increase in the child's caregiving. It is true that an increase in
the child's care provision is possible with proportional beneﬁts as well; however, in any event, the child's
chosen amount of caregiving is always greater with ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts. Therefore, even in the case
when intra-family moral hazard is not a problem, ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts still allow the parent to enjoy
more care given by his child.
3 Fixed vs Proportional: The impact on the parent's insurance
decision
Having compared the impact of insurance on the child's care provision in the cases of ﬁxed and pro-
portional beneﬁts, we can now see how this aﬀects the parent's decision of whether to purchase LTC
insurance or not. More speciﬁcally, the aim of the analysis is to explore with which type of insurance
beneﬁts the parent is more likely to decide to buy a positive amount of insurance. As before, let us
discuss separately the two cases of the child's caregiving preferences.




As in the analysis of the child, in this case I am going to focus on relatively low levels of the child's wage.
Note that if w ≥ δ, the parent will be indiﬀerent between the two types of insurance beneﬁts since the
child will never provide care anyway, which is not interesting for our study.
To examine the parent's decision of whether to purchase insurance or not, we have to look at his
expected utility maximization problem. Recall that the parent's expected utility is given by equation
(1). The parent has to choose the amount of insurance knowing that it will have an eﬀect on his wealth
(bequest) in both states of nature, on his consumption level in the state of independence and on the
child's chosen amount of caregiving in the state of dependence.
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It should ﬁrst be noted that if the parent remains independent, he chooses his consumption level by







To determine whether it is optimal or not for the parent to purchase a positive amount of insurance,
we have to study the sign of the derivative of his expected utility function evaluated at the point of
zero insurance. Deriving with respect to insurance, making use of equation (30) and evaluating at zero
coverage, respectively in the cases of proportional and ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts we get:
∂EUp
∂γ



























































For the case of proportional beneﬁts, a note should be made that here we look at a marginal increase
of γ in the neighbourhood of γ = 0; thus, recalling that we are interested in w < δ, we can reasonably
assume to be in the case w < (1− γ)δ which ensures interior solutions.
Both in the case of proportional and in the case of ﬁxed beneﬁts the derivative has two terms. The
second term appears due to the eﬀect of insurance on the child's caregiving Q. The parent derives utility
from the child's caregiving directly and also through the fact that it reduces the expenditure on formal
care. Thus, since Q is decreasing in insurance coverage (Proposition 1), the second term in the derivative
is negative and goes against the purchase of insurance. If insurance did not have any eﬀect on Q, the
second term would be equal to zero and only the ﬁrst term would be left.
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The ﬁrst term reﬂects the parent's motive to insure his bequest. It should be noted that it is not







point of zero insurance coverage depends on the level of the parent's ﬁnal wealth with no insurance in
each state of nature. If the level of the child's care provision when there is no insurance is suﬃciently
high, it might be that the expenditure on formal care in the state of dependence is smaller than the
parent's consumption in the state of independence, which implies that WDp might be higher than W
I
p .






(even though it still depends on the exact forms of the two
marginal utility functions which are allowed to be diﬀerent). If that is the case, the parent will not buy
insurance neither with proportional nor with ﬁxed beneﬁts (and would not do so even if insurance did
not aﬀect Q), which is not interesting for our analysis. Therefore, I focus on situations when the ﬁrst



















> 0). In other
words, I look at the cases when the parent would deﬁnitely buy some insurance if it had no impact on Q
but might decide not to do so when the eﬀect on Q is taken into account. Such situations will occur if
with no insurance the parent's expenditure on formal care is relatively high compared to his consumption
level in the state of independence. Moreover, the occurrence of such situations becomes more likely if









p ), which seems to be quite reasonable if we think that the parent might be more willing to
award the child in the state of nature where he needs her help.
As mentioned above, the aim of the analysis is to explore in which case - with ﬁxed or with proportional
beneﬁts - the parent is more likely to decide to purchase a positive amount of insurance. The result of
this analysis is stated in Proposition 7:
Proposition 7. Consider a child who dislikes providing LTC to her parent and assume that w <
(1 − γ)δ holds after a purchase of a marginal amount of insurance. Purchasing a positive amount of
insurance is in the interest of the parent more often when insurance beneﬁts are ﬁxed than when insurance
beneﬁts are proportional.
Proposition 7 will be proved if we can show the following:
 if ∂EU
p
∂B |B=0 ≤ 0, then ∂EU
p
∂γ |γ=0 < 0 (i.e. if the parent does not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to buy a positive






∂γ |γ=0 ≥ 0, then ∂EU
p
∂B |B=0 > 0 (i.e. if the parent ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to buy insurance when
beneﬁts are proportional, he will deﬁnitely ﬁnd it beneﬁcial when beneﬁts are ﬁxed)
but the reverse is not true.
This is indeed shown in the Appendix.
To summarize, we have seen that, in the case when the child dislikes providing care, insurance is
more likely to be in the interest of the parent when beneﬁts are ﬁxed rather than proportional. To put
it diﬀerently, the non-purchase of LTC insurance is more likely in the case of proportional beneﬁts. The
reason for this result is the fact that, as seen in the analysis of the child, the phenomenon of intra-family
moral hazard is less pronounced with ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts. With ﬁxed beneﬁts, the purchase of
insurance has less severe consequences to the parent in terms of the reduction in the child's caregiving,
which makes it more likely that these negative consequences will be oﬀset by the positive eﬀects of
insurance.




To avoid corner solutions, the analysis in this case is focused on relatively high levels of the child's wage,
i.e. w > δ.
To compare the parent's decisions of whether to buy a positive amount of insurance or not, we can
again look at ∂EU
p
∂γ |γ=0 and ∂EU
p
∂B |B=0. Their expressions in this case are the same as given by (31) and
(32), but the signs of ∂Q∂γ |γ=0 and ∂Q∂B |B=0 are now diﬀerent. As seen in the analysis of the child, in this
case insurance with ﬁxed beneﬁts always induces the child to increase her caregiving (Proposition 4),
which means that ∂Q∂B |B=0 is now always positive. Again focusing on the cases where the ﬁrst term of the
derivatives is positive, this implies that ∂EU
p
∂B |B=0 is now always positive as well and so the parent will
always decide to buy a positive amount of insurance when beneﬁts are ﬁxed.
On the other hand, from Proposition 4 we know that with proportional beneﬁts the eﬀect of insurance
on Q is ambiguous. This implies that the sign of ∂EU
p




positive and thus the parent will always buy a positive amount of insurance with proportional beneﬁts
as well. However, if ∂Q∂γ |γ=0 < 0, it is possible that ∂EU
p
∂γ |γ=0 will turn negative, which means that in the
case of proportional beneﬁts it might be optimal for the parent not to purchase insurance at all.
The above can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 8. Consider a child who likes providing LTC to her parent and has a wage w > δ.
Assume also that the parent would buy insurance in the absence of an impact on the child's caregiving.
When insurance has an impact on the child's caregiving, purchasing a positive amount of insurance is
always in the interest of the parent when insurance beneﬁts are ﬁxed. With proportional insurance beneﬁts,
purchasing a positive amount of insurance is not always in the interest of the parent.
Proposition 8 ﬂows naturally from the analysis of the child. Since, when the child likes providing
care, ﬁxed beneﬁts completely eliminate intra-family moral hazard, the intra-family moral hazard related
motive for the non-purchase of insurance simply disappears. Even more than that can be said: since in
this case insurance even induces the child to increase her caregiving, the impact on the child becomes
an argument pushing for (and not against as before) the purchase of insurance. Thus, even in the case
when the parent would not buy insurance in the absence of an eﬀect on the child, he might decide to
purchase insurance precisely because of the positive impact on the child's caregiving. It is true that
the same situation is possible with proportional beneﬁts as well; however, with proportional beneﬁts the
possibility of intra-family moral hazard still remains, in which case the parent might be discouraged from
purchasing insurance. Therefore, as in the case when the child dislikes providing care, we can conclude
here as well that insurance is in the interest of the parent more often when beneﬁts are ﬁxed than when
they are proportional.
Conclusion
The paper has raised and explored formally the idea that, in the context of intra-family moral hazard
suggested by Pauly (1990), ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts might have a somewhat diﬀerent impact on the
behavior of children and parents than beneﬁts proportional to LTC expenditure do. In particular, the
paper has studied and compared the eﬀects that insurance with ﬁxed and proportional beneﬁts has on
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the caregiving choice of a child and examined how these diﬀerent eﬀects inﬂuence the insurance purchase
decisions of a parent who values the care provided by his child.
The results of the paper formally conﬁrm the intuitive hypothesis that ﬁxed insurance beneﬁts should
help to limit intra-family moral hazard. Indeed, in the case of a child who dislikes providing care, the
paper ﬁnds that even though the child's caregiving is decreasing in insurance coverage with both types
of beneﬁts, the same amount of LTC insurance purchased by the parent results in more care provided
by the child when insurance beneﬁts are ﬁxed rather than proportional. Thus, with ﬁxed beneﬁts the
child reduces her caregiving less drastically. The amount of the child's care provision is greater with ﬁxed
than with proportional beneﬁts when she likes providing care as well. In that case, ﬁxed beneﬁts even
eliminate intra-family moral hazard completely, whereas the eﬀect of proportional beneﬁts is ambiguous.
These diﬀerences between ﬁxed and proportional beneﬁts have direct consequences on the parent's
insurance decisions. Indeed, even though generally the parent might ﬁnd insurance undesirable with both
types of beneﬁts, it is shown that purchasing a positive amount of insurance is more likely to be in the
parent's interest when beneﬁts are ﬁxed rather than proportional. In other words, the non-purchase of
LTC insurance is more likely with proportional beneﬁt schemes.
The ﬁndings of the paper can be of some use to public policy as well. Zweifel and Strüwe (1998) have
raised concerns about the welfare eﬀects that are/could be caused by a compulsory social LTC insurance.
In particular, since (because of intra-family moral hazard) parents might in many cases ﬁnd private LTC
insurance undesirable, imposing a compulsory social insurance might go against the interests of many
parents. The analysis in this paper has, however, shown that insurance can be made more acceptable
to parents by using ﬁxed beneﬁt schemes. In addition to this, children are better-oﬀ with ﬁxed beneﬁts
as well. Intra-family moral hazard thus pushes for favouring public schemes with ﬁxed rather than
proportional beneﬁts.
Finally, it should be reminded that the analysis in this paper is focused on the context of intra-
family moral hazard and thus abstracts from other factors and situations that could potentially modify
the conclusions about the desirability of ﬁxed and proportional insurance beneﬁts. For instance, while
the model is limited to a single level of LTC needs, one could argue that the presence of uncertainty
about these needs would enhance the desirability of proportional insurance beneﬁts. In such a more
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comprehensive framework one could thus expect the parent to ﬁnd himself facing a tradeoﬀ between
a better protection against the uncertainty oﬀered by proportional insurance and a limitation of intra-
family moral hazard achieved with ﬁxed beneﬁts. On the other hand, it should be noted that ﬁxed beneﬁt
schemes often allow the size of the beneﬁts to depend on the degree of the insured's dependence, which
(at least to some extent) improves their performance in terms of protection against uncertain needs and
increases their chances to be overall preferred to proportional ones.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 7
Let us start by proving the ﬁrst statement: if ∂EU
p
∂B |B=0 ≤ 0, then ∂EU
p
∂γ |γ=0 < 0.
Assume that ∂EU
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If we show that (35) holds, then (34) holds as well (because of (33)).
Since ∂u
p
∂Q |B=0 = ∂u
p
∂Q |γ=0 and ∂u
p
∂WDp




















We get from (16) and (17):
∂Q
∂γ





























Thus, (37) clearly holds, which means that (35) and thus (34) holds.
Now let us prove the second statement: if ∂EU
p
∂γ |γ=0 ≥ 0, then ∂EU
p
∂B |B=0 > 0.
Assume that ∂EU
p






















We need to show that ∂EU
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|B=0 > δ(L¯−Q) (46)
which we have shown to be true above.
It can be easily seen that the reverse of the two claims is not true.
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